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1 Introduction
Autonomy is perplexing. It is recognisably and undeniably a critical issue in the field
of intelligent agents and multi-agent systems, yet it is often ignored or simply assumed.
For many, agents are autonomous by definition, and they see no need to add the tautol-
ogous prefix in explicitly considering autonomous agents, while for others autonomy in
agents is an important yet problematic issue that demands attention. The difficulty when
considering autonomy, however, is that there are different conceptual levels at which to
reason and argue, including the philosophical and the practical.
The notion of autonomy has associated with it many variations of meaning. Ac-
cording to Steels, autonomous systems must be automatic systems and, in addition,
they must have the capacity to form and adapt their behaviour while operating in the
environment. Thus traditional AI systems and most robots are automatic but not au-
tonomous — they are not independent of the control of their designers [7].
2 What is Autonomy?
A dictionary definition will tell us, among other things, that autonomy amounts to free-
dom of will (and we will add that it includes the ability to exercise that will). In short,
this means that it provides the ability to exercise choice, which is particularly relevant in
the context of goals and goal-directed behaviour, as in Castelfranchi’s notions of goal
(or motivational) autonomy [1]. In this view, autonomous agents are able to generate
their own goals, to select between multiple alternative goals to pursue, and to decide
to adopt goals from others (to further their own ends). Franklin and Graesser’s defini-
tion of an autonomous agent as a system that pursues “its own agenda” reinforces this
perspective [4].
Now, from a purely conceptual or theoretical point of view removed from practical
considerations, autonomy can naturally be regarded as absolute, without dimension or
measure of degree. Yet, this strong view of autonomy contrasts with much of the practi-
cal work with agents in which autonomy is taken to be the same as independence, a very
distinctly relative notion. In what might be called this weak view, a non-autonomous
agent either depends on others or is fixed (eg an automaton), while an autonomous
agent can either be independent or depend on others. It is this last point that seems to
suggest that autonomy is not the same as independence — an agent does not simply
lose its autonomy by virtue of depending on another for a particular goal; situations of
dependence occur also for autonomous agents.
Practically then, the notion of independence can be used as an approximation for
autonomy with the added benefit that it admits the dimensions and measures of de-
gree that are missing from the strong view. In this sense it might be considered as a
valuable practical realisation of autonomy, and provides a way to characterise different
dependence situations.
3 Autonomy through Motivation
For all the difficulty in pinning down autonomy, it is in our view key to understanding
the nature and behaviour both of individual agents, and of interactions between them. In
a series of papers, we have described and formally specified an extended theory of agent
interaction, based on goals and motivations, which takes exactly this standpoint. The
theory describes a framework for categorising different agents [5], and has been used
as a basis for investigating aspects of the relationships between agents [6], providing an
operational account of their invocation and destruction [3], as well as for reformulating
existing systems and theories, including those relating to dependence situations [2].
In essence, autonomous agents possess goals that are generated within rather than
adopted from other agents. These goals are generated from motivations, higher-level
non-derivative components characterizing the nature of the agent that can be regarded
as any desires or preferences affecting the outcome of a given reasoning or behavioural
task. For example, greed is not a goal in the classical artificial intelligence sense since
it does not specify a state of affairs to be achieved, nor is it describable in terms of the
environment. However, it may give rise to the generation of a goal to rob a bank. The
distinction between the motivation of greed and the goal of robbing a bank is clear, with
the former providing a reason to do the latter, and the latter specifying what must be
done.
This view of autonomous agents is based on the generation and transfer of goals be-
tween agents. More specifically, something is an agent if it can be viewed as satisfying a
goal that is first created and then, if necessary and appropriate, transferred to another. It
is the adoption of goals that gives rise to agenthood, and it is the self-generation of goals
that is responsible for autonomy. Thus an agent is just something either that is useful
to another agent in terms of satisfying that agent’s goals, or that exhibits independent
purposeful behaviour. Importantly, agents rely on the existence of others to provide the
goals that they adopt for instantiation as agents. In order to escape an infinite regress
of goal adoption, however, we define autonomous agents to be just agents that generate
their own goals from motivations.
4 Conclusion
The answer to whether we can control autonomy depends on the viewpoint adopted.
In the strong view, it is by definition impossible to control autonomy externally. At
the same time, however, we can design agents with appropriate motivations and mo-
tivational mechanisms that constrain and guide agent behaviour as a result of internal
imposition. In this way, control is on-board, and more and better processing of environ-
mental information is required.
We must also question the need for autonomy. Certainly, there is value in the flexi-
bility and robustness that autonomy can bring in a dynamic and open world, but many
problems which merit an agent approach do not necessarily require autonomous be-
haviour. Indeed, the strong view of autonomy can be very dangerous if used for exam-
ple in military applications for tank or missile control; independence with respect to a
user or designer can often be bad. Thus, we also need to consider the kinds of situations
to which autonomy is suited.
While we have offered an absolute theoretical viewpoint of autonomy as well as
a weaker alternative that provides a practical realisation of it that is useful for many,
it is important to understand the difference in purpose and context of these notions,
and not to be dogmatic in practical situations. Clearly there is value in studying the
general concept of autonomy, regardless of practical concerns, but we must also address
ourselves to the practical imperative. It matters little what we call it (just as it matters
little whether we call a program an agent) as long as it gives us the required robustness
and flexibility we desire.
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